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I. INTRODUCTION
A significant part of the American dream is home ownership.1
However, this dream became a nightmare for many homeowners
when the housing bubble burst in 2008.2  Prior to the collapse, there
were record numbers of Americans who owned their own homes.3
When property values began dropping in 2006 and 2007, many Ameri-
cans found that they owed more than their homes were currently
worth.4  This led to a drastic decline in homeownership and a record
number of foreclosures.5  In response to this housing crisis, state and
federal governments have attempted to enact legislation or create pro-
grams to assist homeowners, with varying degrees of success.6
† J.D. Candidate, May 2015, William S. Boyd School of Law.  B.A., Psychology
and Criminal Justice, 2012, University of Nevada Las Vegas.
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1. Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Homeownership—Dream or Disaster?, 21 J. AFFORDA-
BLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 17, 23 (2012).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 20.
4. Id. at 20, 28.
5. Id. at 20–21.
6. See Kathryn E. Johnson & Carolyn E. Waldrep, The North Carolina Banking
Institute Symposium on the Foreclosure Crisis: Overview, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 191,
203–213, 214–16 (2010) (discussing the following federal programs, “HOPE for
1
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Although the crisis has been gradually improving, “analysts esti-
mate that between 7.4 million and 9.4 million additional home loans
are now in danger of default over the next six years. . . . [A]ssum[ing]
no further price declines or interest rate rises.”7  As states get more
desperate to solve this crisis, they consider more drastic remedies.
One such remedy is using the power of eminent domain to force lend-
ers to sell their mortgage notes to the city.8  Once the city owns the
mortgage, the homeowner could either make monthly mortgage pay-
ments to the city, or get out from underwater by refinancing their loan
at current property values.9  Either way, the danger of foreclosure is
eliminated.
The legality of this novel use of eminent domain remains uncertain
and hotly contested.10  Lenders, afraid of losing millions of dollars,
have filed suit in cities like Richmond, California—where the plan has
progressed the furthest—however, the courts have yet to rule on the
plan’s legality.11  Many cities have considered eminent domain as a
solution, but backed down after lenders threatened to make credit
more expensive or withdraw credit entirely from these regions.12
Ultimately, though, if lenders were to follow through on these
threats, the result would be unlawfully discriminatory.  Since the late
Homeowners,” “Making Home Affordable,” “Helping Families Save Their Homes
Act of 2009,” and “Neighborhood Stabilization Program”); see also Salsich, supra
note 1, at 40–51; Aleatra P. Williams, Foreclosing Foreclosure: Escaping the Yawning
Abyss of the Deep Mortgage and Housing Crisis, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 455, 461
(2012).
7. Robert Hockett, Six Years on and Still Counting: Sifting Through the Mortgage
Mess, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 373, 374 (2013).
8. Ngai Pindell, Nevada’s Residential Real Estate Crisis: Local Governments and
the Use of Eminent Domain to Condemn Mortgage Notes, 13 NEV. L.J. 888, 889–90
(2013).
9. Id.
10. See Josh Harkinson, Inside the Radical Plan to Fight Foreclosures With Emi-
nent Domain, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/
2013/01/eminent-domain-mortgage-gluckstern.
11. Terrence Dopp, Newark Advances Eminent Domain Plan to Slow Foreclo-
sures, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 5, 2013, 12:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
12-05/newark-advances-eminent-domain-plan-to-slow-foreclosures.html (“In Septem-
ber, a judge dismissed a lawsuit by Bank of New York Mellon and Wilmington Trust
Co. that sought to stop Richmond’s program, saying the case came too early to evalu-
ate the legal merits.”).
12. Shaila Dewan, More Cities Consider Using Eminent Domain to Halt Foreclo-
sures, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/busi-
ness/more-cities-consider-eminent-domain-to-halt-foreclosures.html?_r=0 (“Several
local governments that have considered the plan eventually backed away, including
San Bernardino County and North Las Vegas.”); ALFRED M. POLLARD, FEDERAL
HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
REGARDING INPUT ON USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN TO RESTRUCTURE MORTGAGES
(Aug. 7, 2013), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/25418/GCMemorandumEmi-
nentDomain.pdf.
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1960s, Congress has been regulating consumer transactions,13 includ-
ing promulgating the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (“FHA”) and the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 (“ECOA”) to provide protec-
tion in consumer lending.14  The FHA and ECOA were enacted to
protect would-be homeowners from discriminatory lending practices
that plagued minority communities.15  Since the 1970s, these statutes
have been primarily used to fight against lenders who discriminatorily
withhold credit—in a process known as redlining—however, more re-
cently, the FHA and ECOA have been invoked to combat lenders
targeting minorities for outrageous loans, destined to default—a pro-
cess known as reverse redlining.16  Over the last forty years, these stat-
utes and their enforcement, have proven flexible enough to fight new
forms of discriminatory lending as they arise.17
This Note will demonstrate that the FHA and ECOA prohibit im-
plementation of lenders’ threats to limit or refuse credit availability
because the result would have a disproportionate effect on minorities.
This Note will examine the legality of the lenders’ threats to withhold
credit and, in doing so, presumes that courts will find this novel use of
eminent domain constitutional.  First, Part II will discuss the current
situation.  Section IIA will explain eminent domain and explore pre-
cisely how cities hope to use it in the mortgage note context.  Section
IIB will describe the growth of this plan and the cities that have con-
sidered using it.  Section IIC will elaborate on the threats that the
lenders are making toward the cities that consider using eminent do-
main.  Second, Part III will discuss the various laws that regulate con-
sumer transactions and how they have restricted lenders in the past.
Section IIIA will give a brief history of redlining and its consequences.
Section IIIB will discuss the circumstances surrounding the enactment
of the FHA and ECOA and exactly what actions these statutes pro-
hibit. Section IIIC will discuss the three causes of action that arise
under the FHA and the ECOA. Section IIID will further explore dis-
parate impact and how courts have interpreted 24 C.F.R. Section
13. FRED H. MILLER & JOHN D. LACKEY, THE ABCS OF THE UCC: RELATED
AND SUPPLEMENTARY CONSUMER LAW 15–16 (2d ed. 2004).
14. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18266-01, 18268
(Apr. 15, 1994); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2012); Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2012).
15. Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and
Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787, 797 (1995).
16. Charles L. Nier, III & Maureen R. St. Cyr, A Racial Financial Crisis: Rethink-
ing the Theory of Reverse Redlining to Combat Predatory Lending Under the Fair
Housing Act, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 941, 945 (2011).
17. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. at 18267 (“Dis-
crimination in lending on the basis of race or other prohibited factors is destructive,
morally repugnant, and against the law. It prevents those who are discriminated
against from enjoying the benefits of access to credit. The Agencies will not tolerate
lending discrimination in any form.”).
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100.500, which was enacted on March 18, 2013.18  Lastly, Part IV will
apply disparate impact to the lenders’ threats and work through the
disparate impact analysis in detail to analyze the likelihood that the
FHA and the ECOA will be successful in restricting the lenders’
threats.
II. THE CURRENT CRISIS
A. Eminent Domain as a Solution
Eminent domain is provided for in the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.19  The Clause states that “private property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”20  Historically, the
government used eminent domain to seize land for the “development
of roads, drainage of land, construction of government buildings, and
compensation to property owners for flooding of their lands caused by
local mills.”21  However, over the years, the definition of “public use”
has evolved from a narrow view—requiring that the public actually be
able to use the seized property—to a more abstract and broad view,
which includes takings that “provide a public benefit or serve a public
purpose.”22
There have been three landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases regard-
ing the interpretation of public use.23  In Berman v. Parker, the Su-
preme Court ruled that “promoting public welfare” was valid as a
public use and deferred much of the eminent domain review to the
state legislature.24  The Court emphasized that public use does not re-
quire that the public actually use the property—private parties could
own the redeveloped property without issue.25  In Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff, the Supreme Court held that the “purpose of the
taking, not its mechanics,” is what must be justified as a public use.  In
other words, the public does not need to be able to use the land as
long as taking the land accomplishes a public purpose.26  Moreover,
the Court held that rational basis review was to be used when deter-
mining whether there is a “conceivable public purpose.”27  Finally, in
18. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013).
19. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), Takings Clause.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 5.
21. David B. Fawcett III, Comment, Eminent Domain, the Police Power, and the
Fifth Amendment: Defining the Domain of the Takings Analysis, 47 U. PITT. L. REV.
491, 494 (1986).
22. Nancy Kubasek & Garrett Coyle, A Step Backward Is Not Necessarily A Step
in the Wrong Direction, 30 VT. L. REV. 43, 46–48, 46 n.22 (2005).
23. Id. at 50.
24. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Kubasek & Coyle, supra note 22, at
51.
25. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33–34; Kubasek & Coyle, supra note 22, at 50.
26. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984); Kubasek & Coyle,
supra note 22, at 53.
27. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 242–43; Kubasek & Coyle, supra note 22, at
53.
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Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court held that the legiti-
mate public use required by the Takings Clause includes projects de-
signed to create new jobs, generate taxes, or otherwise seek to
“promot[e] economic development.”28
The Court’s broad definition of public use under the Fifth Amend-
ment has paved the way for cities like Richmond, California, to turn
to eminent domain as a means of reducing the ills associated with va-
cant, uncared-for homes, while simultaneously generating much-
needed tax revenue.29  Richmond argues that “[s]ixteen percent of
mortgages in the city have gone into foreclosure, which . . . has wors-
ened crime, vacancy, and blight.”30  Under the Supreme Court’s broad
and deferential definition of “public use,” here, it seems as though
Richmond’s stated purpose is sufficient to properly invoke the state’s
power of eminent domain.
The idea to use eminent domain to seize underwater mortgage
notes originated in San Francisco at an investment firm called Mort-
gage Resolution Partners LLC (“MRP”).  MRP plans to collaborate
with cities and counties greatly affected by the housing crisis to reduce
the principals and monthly payments so people can keep their
homes.31  To accomplish this, the cities will force the lenders to sell
their mortgage notes and will give the lenders fair market value in
return.32  This is where MRP becomes essential: these struggling cities
do not have the money to buy all of these mortgages, MRP will pro-
28. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472, 489 (2005); Kubasek & Coyle,
supra note 22, at 57. In the aftermath of Kelo, many states changed their eminent
domain laws to be much stricter on the definition of “public use.” However, this does
not necessarily mean that the current mortgage plan will fail, as there are many differ-
ences between seizing homes and seizing mortgage notes; see Pindell, supra note 8, at
893–900.
29. Harkinson, supra note 10 (stating “how preventing a single foreclosure could
save the city nearly $20,000 in lost taxes and other expenses.”); Shaila Dewan, Emi-
nent Domain: A Long Shot Against Blight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2014, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/business/in-richmond-california-a-long-shot-again
st-blight.html.
30. Lydia DePillis, Wall Street Has So Far Crushed a Drastic Foreclosure Fix. One
California Town Could Change That, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/10/wall-street-has-so-far-crushed-a-dras-
tic-foreclosure-fix-one-california-town-could-change-that/.
31. Home, MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, http://mortgageresolution.com/
(last visited Jan. 26, 2014); Richard E. Gottlieb & Vivian I. Kim, Eminent Domain:
Will Local Governments Attempt to Use This Extraordinary Power to Purchase Troub-
led Residential Mortgages?, 31 No. 11 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1, 4
(2012).
32. Carl Gibson, Richmond, California Mayor Occupies Wall Street, HUFFINGTON
POST, Oct. 17, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carl-gibson/richmond-california-
mayor_b_4118203.html; Emily Badger, Why Wall Street Is Very, Very Angry at Rich-
mond, California, Right Now, THE ATLANTIC CITIES: PLACE MATTERS (Sept. 11,
2013), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/housing/2013/09/why-wall-street-very-very-an-
gry-richmond-california-today/6858/.
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vide the capital in exchange for a flat fee of $4,500.00 per loan.33
MRP’s plan allows the lenders to conduct their own appraisals to en-
sure that the lender receives adequate compensation.34  Once an ap-
praisal is done, lenders could accept the payment from MRP and still
challenge whether the amount was high enough in court.35  Once the
city owns the mortgage note, the homeowner could continue making
payments to the city to pay the mortgage, or refinance the mortgage
with another lender at the current fair market value.36  Steven M.
Gluckstern, the company’s chair,37 “calculates that a family . . . that
bought a $200,000 house that’s now worth $100,000 . . . would see its
monthly payments decrease from between $800 to $300.”38
It is not surprising that the lenders are upset.  MRP’s plan provides
the lenders with a mortgage’s current fair market value, but com-
pletely ignores the amount of the original loan, so the lenders may
lose money overall.39  In a complaint filed against Richmond, Wells
Fargo asserted that it could lose $200 million on the 624 mortgages
Richmond planned to seize.40
Gluckstern, however, believes that lenders like Wells Fargo are ex-
aggerating estimated losses because they are outraged at having their
dominance of the financial system challenged.  If it is true, as studies
suggest, that “80 percent of underwater mortgages owned by private-
label securities will end up defaulting,”41 lenders would not be likely
to get much more than fair market value from a foreclosure sale—
leaving a deficiency identical to the one under MRP’s plan.42  MRP’s
plan may well prove to be more economically beneficial to these
banks because under MRP’s plan, banks would not have to pay up-
keep on vacant homes before the homes can be sold.  Indeed, Rich-
mond has even begun “fining banks $1,000 a day if they fail to
33. Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 31, at 4; Harkinson, supra note 10; DePillis, supra
note 30.
34. Gibson, supra note 32.
35. Jon Prior, Still no partner for radical mortgage resolution, POLITICO (Jan. 16,
2013, 4:39 AM), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=C1252E22-11FC-403D-
8F06-D21F86EE27AA.
36. Pindell, supra note 8, at 889–90.
37. Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 31, at 1; Management, MORTGAGE RESOLUTION
PARTNERS, http://mortgageresolution.com/management (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
38. Harkinson, supra note 10.
39. See FAQS, MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS, http://mortgageresolution.
com/faqs (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
40. Jody Shenn et al., Pimco, BlackRock Seek to Bar California Mortgage Seizures,
BLOOMBERG PERSONAL FINANCE (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2013-08-07/bondholders-sue-california-city-to-block-mortgage-seizures-1-.html.
41. Harkinson, supra note 10.
42. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), deficiency (“The amount still owed
when the property secured by a mortgage is sold at a foreclosure sale for less than the
outstanding debt.”).
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maintain the properties they own and they have collected $1.5 million
so far.”43
B. The Housing Crisis in Nevada and in Other States
Many cities across the nation that were hit especially hard by the
housing crisis have considered implementing eminent domain to help
their struggling citizens.  In June 2012, San Bernardino County was
one of the first to consider using eminent domain after a record num-
ber of foreclosures and no relief in sight.44  After this first look, many
other cities and counties have considered or are actively trying to im-
plement eminent domain.  Together with San Bernardino County,
Richmond County and the California cities of Fontana and Ontario
have formed a committee to explore the idea.45  Thirty other local
governments followed suit,46 including the cities of: North Las Vegas,
in Nevada;47 Sacramento,48 Berkeley,49 Pomona,50 El Monte,51 Oak-
land,52 and Salinas53 in California; Seattle, in Washington;54 Yonkers55
43. Dewan, supra note 29.
44. Mark Muckenfuss, SAN BERNARDINO: County Steps Forward on Housing
Idea, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE (June 30, 2012, 4:52 PM), http://www.pe.com/local-
news/san-bernardino-county/san-bernardino-county-headlines-index/20120630-san-
bernardino-county-steps-forward-on-housing-idea.ece (“The rate in San Bernardino
and Riverside counties is one foreclosure per 179 homes, which is 31/2 times the na-
tional average.”).
45. Muckenfuss, supra note 44.
46. Prior, supra note 35.
47. James Dehaven, North Las Vegas approves plan to use eminent domain to aid
underwater homeowners, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (June 20, 2013, 10:49 PM),
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/las-vegas/north-las-vegas-approves-plan-use-emi-
nent-domain-aid-underwater-homeowners.
48. Hudson Sangree, Eminent Domain Would Aid Underwater Owners, THE SAC-
RAMENTO BEE, Aug. 11, 2012, at A1.
49. Oksana Yurovsky, Berkeley City Council explores solutions to home foreclo-
sures, THE DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Aug. 5, 2012), http://www.dailycal.org/2012/08/05/
berkeley-city-council-explores-solutions-to-home-foreclosures/.
50. Monica Rodriguez, Pomona to hear eminent domain proposal, DAILY BULLE-
TIN NEWS (May 11, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.dailybulletin.com/general-news/
20130512/pomona-to-hear-eminent-domain-proposal.
51. Shaila Dewan, A City Invokes Seizure Laws to Save Homes, N.Y. TIMES, July
29, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/business/in-a-shift-eminent-
domain-saves-homes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
52. Labor Solidarity Comm., Special Oakland City Council Meeting to Consider
Resolution in Support of Richmond’s Proposed Mortgage Relief Program using Emi-
nent Domain., OCCUPY OAKLAND (Oct. 27, 2013), https://occupyoakland.org/ai1ec_
event/special-oakland-city-council-meeting-consider-resolution-support-richmonds-
proposed-mortgage-relief-program-using-eminent-domain/?instance_id=.
53. ASF Submits Letter to Salinas, CA Opposing Proposed Eminent Domain
Agreement with MRP, AMERICAN SECURITIZATION FORUM (Dec. 16, 2012), http://
www.americansecuritization.com/content.aspx?id=8651#.UtiCxrRzLKc.
54. Alison Morrow, Underwater homeowners get a chance for relief in Seattle,
KING5.COM (Dec. 11, 2013, 6:33 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20140217091338/
http://www.king5.com/news/cities/seattle/Underwater-homeowners-get-a-chance-for-
relief-in-Seattle-235497161.html.
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in New York; Newark56 and Irvington57 in New Jersey; Chicago;58 and
Brockton59 in Massachusetts.
Unfortunately, most of these cities have succumbed to the pressure
put on them by national lenders and the Government-Sponsored En-
terprises (“GSEs”) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.60  However, Rich-
mond, California has refused to back down and has taken MRP’s
proposal further than any other city.61  Richmond’s mayor, Gayle Mc-
Laughlin, is adamant that eminent domain will help struggling home-
owners in Richmond lower their monthly payments and stay in their
homes:
The foreclosure crisis hit Richmond hard. When one home goes into
foreclosure, nine other homes are impacted. That invites blight,
crime, and affects the city’s tax base as a result. When there are
neighborhoods with lots of vacant homes, that means there aren’t
enough homeowners with money to spend in local economies, to
send their kids to our schools, to support local business. So this is
addressing all of that.
We want to stop homelessness, and we want to keep families in their
homes, living and working in our community. We’ve got people
hanging on by their fingernails right now. And we’ve bailed out the
banks to the tune of $2 trillion. We just want them to not stand in
our way.62
Still, Richmond has not actually implemented eminent domain.63  In
July 2013, the city sent out letters to the lenders of 624 homes asking
them to sell their mortgage notes at fair market value—unsurprisingly,
all lenders declined.64  Currently, two banks have brought lawsuits
against Richmond challenging the legality of the program and pushing
55. The Daily Voice, Yonkers City Council Explores Program To Help Homeown-
ers In Foreclosure, YONKERS: DAILY VOICE (Nov. 20, 2013), http://yonkers.dailyvoice.
com/news/yonkers-city-council-explores-program-help-homeowners-foreclosure.
56. Dopp, supra note 11.
57. Dewan, supra note 12.
58. Micah Maidenberg, Alderman wants to explore fighting foreclosures with emi-
nent domain, CHICAGOREALESTATEDAILY.COM (July 30, 2012), http://www.chi-
cagorealestatedaily.com/article/20120730/CRED03/120739989/alderman-wants-to-
explore-fighting-foreclosures-with-eminent-domain#.
59. Eleazar David Melendez, Brockton, Massachusetts, Considers Eminent Do-
main To Address Foreclosures, HUFF POST: BUSINESS (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.huf
fingtonpost.com/2013/01/11/brockton-eminent-domain-foreclosure_n_2458369.html.
60. See infra Part I Section C.
61. Dewan, supra note 29.
62. Gibson, supra note 32.
63. Christina Mlynski, Eminent domain remains minor headwind as housing recov-
ers, HOUSINGWIRE (Nov. 15, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/
27985-eminent-domain-remains-minor-headwind-as-housing-recovers; Gibson, supra
note 32.
64. DePillis, supra note 30; Shenn, et al., supra note 40.
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for an injunction against the city; however, both have been dismissed
as not ripe.65
C. The Lenders’ Reactions
To prevent local governments from implementing this plan, lenders
have began bullying cities that consider it.66  The Federal Housing Fi-
nance Agency (“FHFA”)67 released a statement in August 2013, stat-
ing that FHFA may:
[I]nitiate legal challenges to any local or state action that sanctions
the use of eminent domain to restructure mortgage loan contracts
that affect FHFA’s regulated entities; act by order or by regulation
to direct the regulated entities to limit, restrict or cease business
activities within the jurisdiction of any state or local authority em-
ploying eminent domain to restructure mortgage loan contracts.68
Likewise, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(“SIFMA”) asserted in a statement, following Richmond’s decision to
continue exploring eminent domain, that “the plan . . . could deter
private capital from returning to the housing markets and make home
loans harder to access and more expensive for all Richmond re-
sidents.”69  This prediction that lenders will cease activity in these ar-
eas is particularly potent because if followed through with, these cities
will face a chilling effect where “no one will give credit to cities that
show they’re willing to seize property like this” and the ones that do
will “hike up interest rates” until the loans are basically infeasible.70
Illustratively, in August 2013, Richmond attempted to sell a highly
rated set of bonds, but was unsuccessful:71
Just days after Richmond became the first city in the country to use
the threat of eminent domain to obtain underwater mortgages, Wall
Street spurned its efforts to refinance its highly rated municipal
bonds, an unusual snub that cost the city nearly $4 million in
lost savings . . . . Bonds are a crucial funding mechanism for local
governments, which depend on them to finance public projects like
roads, schools and utilities. Being unable to sell or refinance bonds
65. See Mlynski, supra note 63.
66. See Harkinson, supra note 10; Dewan, supra note 12.
67. About Us, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, http://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs (last vis-
ited June 15, 2014) (“[The FHFA is an] independent regulatory agency responsible for
the oversight of vital components of the secondary mortgage markets—the housing
government sponsored enterprises of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal
Home Loan Bank System.”).
68. Media Statements, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/
PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Statement-on-Eminent-Domain.aspx (last visited Sept. 12,
2014).
69. SIFMA Statement Following Richmond Vote on Eminent Domain, SIFMA
(Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.sifma.org/newsroom/2013/sifma-statement-following-
richmond-vote-on-eminent-domain/.
70. Badger, supra note 32; Harkinson, supra note 10; Shenn, et al., supra note 40.
71. Dewan, supra note 29.
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to lower interest rates could hurt a city’s ability to meet its long-
term obligations.72
Realistically, if lenders are able to restrict access to credit in these
cities, this action would “stop the [eminent domain] program immedi-
ately.”73  Therefore, this threat, coupled with the inevitable legal bat-
tles,74 have understandably caused several local governments to back
down.75
III. HISTORICAL LIMITATIONS ON LENDERS
Essentially, the lenders want to decline to do business in cities that
implement eminent domain.  Historically, through a process now
known as “redlining,” lenders categorically refused to do business in
certain geographic areas because of the region’s racial or ethnic com-
position.76  Although the lenders’ motives in the current situation are
slightly different—they are refusing business not because of race but
because of the cities’ actions—their motives are irrelevant because
their policy will have a disparate impact on citizens of a minority race
or ethnicity.
A. Redlining
Around the 1930s, lenders began considering factors other than the
value of the borrower’s collateral before approving a loan, such as the
location of the collateral and characteristics of the applicant.77  Thus,
in order to bring some stability and consistency to residential mort-
gage loans, Congress enacted the National Housing Act of 1934,
which created the Federal Housing Administration.78  To achieve na-
tional consistency in lending practices, the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration published a manual that covered, among other topics,
72. Carolyn Said, Eminent domain plan may have spooked investors, SFGATE
(Aug. 29, 2013, 11:00 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/realestate/article/Eminent-domain-
plan-may-have-spooked-investors-4773720.php.
73. Alejandro Lazo, Lt. Gov. Gavin Newsom alleges ‘threats’ against mortgage
plan, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 11, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/11/busi-
ness/la-fi-eminent-domain-20120911.
74. FAQS, supra note 39 (however, MRP has stated that they will pay the costs of
these legal challenges).
75. James Dehaven, North Las Vegas rejects use of eminent domain to rescue
homeowners, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Sept. 4, 2013, 8:55 PM), http://www.
reviewjournal.com/news/government/north-las-vegas-rejects-use-eminent-domain-res-
cue-homeowners; Jean Tepperman, Fearing Wall Street Reprisals, Oakland Council
Abandons Anti-Foreclosure Plans, EAST BAY EXPRESS (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.
eastbayexpress.com/SevenDays/archives/2013/11/20/fearing-wall-street-reprisals-oak-
land-council-abandons-anti-foreclosure-plans; Dewan, supra note 29.
76. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), redlining.
77. ROBERT SCHAFER & HELEN F. LADD, DISCRIMINATION IN MORTGAGE LEND-
ING 4 (1981).
78. Stephen M. Dane, Eliminating the Labyrinth: A Proposal to Simplify Federal
Mortgage Lending Discrimination Laws, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 527, 534–35
(1993).
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creditworthiness of the applicant and adequacy of the collateral.79  For
a decade or so after its creation, this manual actually required lenders
to decline loans to minorities who wished to live in non-minority
neighborhoods.80  Likewise, the American Institute of Real Estate
Appraisers Manual ranked minorities in order of their impact on a
neighborhood’s value.81
The Housing Administration officially eliminated race-based lend-
ing criteria from its manual in the 1960s, but this did not stop the
private lenders from continuing to employ its discriminatory tenets.82
During the 1960s and 1970s, Congress passed legislation, such as the
FHA and the ECOA, to combat this private lending discrimination.83
However, rather than discontinuing these practices altogether, lenders
merely utilized more subtle methods of discrimination that were diffi-
cult to detect and prove.84  These methods allowed the discrimination
to continue almost entirely unchecked until several years after the
FHA had been enacted.85  This discrimination was often seen in the
form of “redlining,” which is where banks and lenders refuse to ex-
tend credit to certain geographic locations, such as those with high
minority or low-income populations.86  Redlining usually refers to the
broader exclusion of people from a certain geographic location and it
is not dependent on the race of the prospective borrower.87  Ulti-
mately, although officially prohibited by the FHA and ECOA, redlin-
ing continued as a pervasive lending practice in many low-income and
inner city areas until the 1990s.88
79. Id. at 535.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 534.
82. Id. at 536.
83. Dane, supra note 78, at 537.
84. Id. (One such method is prescreening and another is to manipulate the terms
and conditions of the loan to take advantage of minorities who may not know it is
disfavorable or who do not have any other option); Id. at 537 n.37.
85. Robert G. Schwemm, Introduction to Mortgage Lending Discrimination Law,
28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 317, 319–20 (1995).
86. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18266-01, 18268
(Apr. 15, 1994) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (Redlining refers to “the illegal
practice of refusing to make residential loans or imposing more onerous terms on any
loans made because of the predominant race, national origin, etc., of the residents of
the neighborhood in which the property is located.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th
ed. 2009), redlining.
87. Swire, supra note 15, at 800–01 (“Some institutions that would not lend to
blacks entering white neighborhoods would indeed provide mortgages once a neigh-
borhood had become clearly black. But many lenders had policies of not making
loans in black neighborhoods. Agencies often refused to insure loans secured by
properties in black neighborhoods . . . .”); Schwemm, supra note 85, at 319 (In Lauf-
man v. Oakley Building & Loan Co., the plaintiff was a “white individual who bought
a house in a racially diverse area of Cincinnati and felt that the defendant did not
provide equal loans in that area. . . . [H]e claimed that he was discriminated against
not because of his race, but because of the racial make-up of the area where he
wanted to buy a house.”).
88. Schwemm, supra note 85, at 321; Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 16, at 947.
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As redlining gained media attention, some unscrupulous lenders re-
alized that they could exploit the minorities and the low-income citi-
zens who were being denied credit by other lenders.  Accordingly,
“reverse redlining”—the practice of targeting communities that had
been victims of redlining in the past for subprime or unfair loans—
began in the late 1900s.89  Redlining facilitated the growth of these
subprime loans because many minority communities that had been
continuously denied credit were both desperate and unsophisticated
enough for lenders to target and exploit.90  Typical reverse redlining
practices include unreasonable interest rates or fees, fraudulent or
misleading marketing, and high rates of refinancing.91  This type of
lending “result[ed] in devastating personal losses, including bank-
ruptcy, poverty, and foreclosure.”92  It has disproportionately affected
minority borrowers and neighborhoods, and has consequently
“strip[ped] assets and wealth from communities of color, and exacer-
bate[d] the wealth gap between black and white families.”93  Although
this lending appeared to be somewhat different from the redlining of
the past, the outcome was the same—minority groups were targeted
and exploited.
B. The FHA and the ECOA
Plaintiffs have used both the FHA and the ECOA to combat differ-
ent types of lending discrimination.94  The Department of Housing
and Urban Development (“HUD”) regulates the implementation of
the FHA, and the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”) regulates the
ECOA.95  Congress enacted the FHA in 1968 as Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968,96 amended in 1988,97 and its purpose is to provide
“fair housing throughout the United States.”98  Section 3605 of the
FHA makes it “unlawful for any person or other entity whose busi-
ness includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to
discriminate against any person in making available such a transac-
tion, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of
89. Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 16, at 942, 944.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 946.
92. Id. at 945 (“Subprime loans also move more quickly into foreclosure than
prime loans do.”).
93. Id. at 946, 948 (predatory lending leads to “increased debt, lost equity, in-
creased foreclosures, and neighborhood devaluation.”).
94. See Dane, supra note 78.
95. Fair Housing Act, 24 C.F.R. § 100.1 (2013); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 12
C.F.R. § 202.1 (2013).
96. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73.
97. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3601).
98. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).
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race, color . . . or national origin.”99  The FHA regulations provide
specific examples of some prohibited practices.100
Likewise, Congress enacted the ECOA in 1974 as Title VII, an
amendment to the Consumer Protection Act,101 and was later
amended in 1976.102  The ECOA’s original purpose was to “make
credit available with fairness, impartiality, and without discrimination
on the basis of sex or marital status.”103  However, the 1976 amend-
ment added language to prevent discrimination based on race, color,
religion, and national origin.104  The ECOA regulations provide spe-
cific examples of some practices that are prohibited.105  Together, the
FHA and ECOA provide comprehensive legislation against lending
discrimination.106
C. Lending Discrimination Causes of Action
To protect minority borrowers effectively, it is necessary to under-
stand what lending discrimination is, and how to prove a lending dis-
crimination case.  There are three recognized categories of lending
discrimination.  The first category is overt discrimination.107  This oc-
curs when a prohibited factor is clearly the basis for a lender’s deci-
sion.108  Today, there are fewer instances of overt discrimination
because lenders are more aware of the requirements imposed on them
by the FHA and ECOA, and realize that there are significant conse-
quences for discriminatory behavior.109
The second category of lending discrimination is disparate treat-
ment.110  This occurs when a lender uses a prohibited factor, such as
race, as a basis to treat applicants differently;111 however, this type is
more difficult to prove than overt discrimination, and often requires
the use of “testers” to provide evidence that a lender has discrimi-
nated in treatment.112
99. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2012).
100. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.120, 100.130, 100.400 (2013).
101. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500.
102. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90
Stat. 251.
103. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 502, 88 Stat. 1500.
104. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239,
§ 701, 90 Stat. 251; Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012).
105. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.4(b), 202.5–202.7 (2013).
106. See Schwemm, supra note 85, at 326–27; Dane, supra note 78, at 546–50.
107. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18266-01, 18268
(Apr. 15, 1994) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
108. Id.
109. See Dane, supra note 78, at 537; Schwemm, supra note 85, at 328.
110. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. at 18268.
111. Id.
112. Schwemm, supra note 85, at 329.
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The third category of recognized discrimination is disparate im-
pact.113  This occurs when a lender applies a policy equally to all appli-
cants, but the policy results in a discriminatory effect on a prohibited
factor.114  Because overt discrimination is all but non-existent, and dis-
parate treatment is not applicable to the situation in Richmond, this
Note will only focus on disparate impact.
There is a new regulation that “formalizes [HUD’s] long-held rec-
ognition of discriminatory effects liability under the Act [the FHA]
and, for purposes of providing consistency nationwide, formalizes a
burden-shifting test for determining whether a given practice has an
unjustified discriminatory effect . . . .”115  The rule, effective on March
18, 2013,  and codified in 24 C.F.R. Section 100.500, provides that “[a]
practice has a discriminatory effect where it actually or predictably
results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, in-
creases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns be-
cause of race, color, . . . or national origin.”116  The purpose of this
regulation is to cover two types of discriminatory effects: “(1) harm to
a particular group of persons by a disparate impact; and (2) harm to
the community generally by creating, increasing, reinforcing, or per-
petuating segregated housing patterns.”117
The regulation then provides what constitutes a prima facie case
and discusses the burden-shifting framework.118  In a typical disparate
impact claim, there is generally only one component to a prima facie
case.119  The plaintiff must show that “a challenged practice caused or
predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.”120  A plaintiff cannot
merely assert or provide their general perception that a policy dispro-
portionately excludes people on a prohibited basis,121 and must gener-
ally present statistical evidence showing that higher percentages of
minorities are excluded than are non-minorities.122  Notably, discrimi-
natory intent is not required.123
113. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. at 18268.
114. Id.; Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Stan-
dard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11460-01, 11460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt.
100); Fair Housing Act, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2013); Stephen M. Dane, Disparate-
Impact Analysis in the Mortgage Lending Context, 115 BANKING L.J. 900, 906 (1998).
115. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. at 11460.
116. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a).
117. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. at 11469.
118. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c).
119. Id. § 100.500(c)(1); Schwemm, supra note 85, at 331.
120. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1).
121. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18266-01, 18269
(Apr. 15, 1994) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100); Implementation of the Fair Hous-
ing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11472.
122. Schwemm, supra note 85, at 331; Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lend-
ing, 59 Fed. Reg., at 18269.
123. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1).
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After the plaintiff demonstrates that a lender’s policies have a dis-
criminatory impact, the burden shifts to the defendant-lender to
demonstrate that “the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one
or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the de-
fendant;”124 however, the interests cannot be “hypothetical or specu-
lative.”125  Afterwards, even if the lender has successfully provided a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the practice, a plaintiff may
still prevail by demonstrating that “the substantial, legitimate, nondis-
criminatory interest(s) supporting the challenged practice could be
served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”126
Again, this evidence cannot be “hypothetical or speculative.”127  If the
plaintiff cannot provide a less-discriminatory alternative method to
address the defendant’s legitimate interests, the case fails because the
defendant has provided a legally sufficient justification for the dispa-
rate impact.128
D. Understanding Disparate Impact
Because disparate impact allows a legitimate justification of dis-
criminatory practices as a defense, fully understanding disparate im-
pact requires a discussion of how the courts should interpret these
terms.  For example, it is important to explore which justifications
tend to be “substantial, legitimate, and nondiscriminatory;” along with
how strict the standard is for evaluating if a “challenged practice could
not be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory ef-
fect;” and lastly, what “hypothetical or speculative” means.129
HUD has clarified its regulation regarding the implementation of
the FHA’s discriminatory effects standard.  First, HUD clarified two
of the terms in the phrase “substantial, legitimate, and nondiscrimina-
tory” from 24 C.F.R. Section 100.500(b)(1)(i).  HUD defines “sub-
stantial” as “a core interest of the organization that has a direct
relationship to the function of that organization.”130  HUD also states
that determining which “goals, objectives, and activities” are substan-
tial enough to qualify as a legitimate justification for discrimination is
a “case-specific, fact based inquiry.”131  One commentator asked
HUD to include examples of interests that would meet the necessary
standard but HUD declined to do this, choosing only to reiterate that
it is a “case specific inquiry.”132  Additionally, the term “legitimate”
124. Id. § 100.500(c)(2).
125. Id. § 100.500(b)(2).
126. Id. § 100.500(c)(3).
127. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(2).
128. Id. § 100.500(b)(1)(i)–(ii).
129. Id. § 100.500(b)(2), (c)(2)–(3).
130. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. 11460–01, 11470 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 11471.
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requires that the interest be objectively genuine and not false,
fabricated, or pretextual.133  HUD specifically rejected the term “busi-
ness necessity” already used in other areas of discrimination law be-
cause HUD was concerned that courts and litigants would
misinterpret that standard to apply only to businesses rather than the
“full scope of practices covered by the Fair Housing Act, which ap-
plies to individuals, businesses, nonprofit organizations, and public en-
tities.”134  It is important to note that, although HUD rejected the
language of “business necessity,” the statute requires that a defendant
show the “challenged practice is necessary” to achieve a legitimate
interest.135  HUD used the word “necessary” in 24 C.F.R. Section
100.500(b)(1)(i) because this broad language best achieves the goal of
the FHA, and it is consistent with the historical disparate impact doc-
trine that also required it be necessary.136
Second, HUD clarified the requirement that the defendant’s “chal-
lenged practice could not be served by another practice that has a less
discriminatory effect” from 24 C.F.R. Section 100.500(b)(1)(ii).  HUD
declined to articulate a standard to use to interpret this language.
Commenters suggested adding language that would help clarify the
parameters of this requirement, such as saying that the less discrimina-
tory practice be “equally effective” or “at least as effective”; however,
HUD decided not to elaborate on the requirement.  HUD stated that
adding a standard such as “equally effective” would be inappropriate
given the “wider range and variety of practices covered by the Act
that are not readily quantifiable.”137  HUD emphasized that in prov-
ing that a less discriminatory alternative exists, the plaintiff must also
show that the alternative “effectively address the lender’s concerns”
that are allegedly being protected or advanced by the discriminatory
practice.138
Third, HUD clarified the terms “hypothetical or speculative” as
used in 24 C.F.R. Section 100.500(b)(2).  HUD stated that this lan-
guage excludes relationships that are imagined out of “speculation,
hypothesis, generalization, stereotype, or fear”—the defendants must
provide actual evidence that there is a relationship between an appro-
priate interest and the challenged practice.139
133. Id. at 11470.
134. Id. (“[Business necessity has been used with] judicial interpretations of the
Fair Housing Act, with HUD’s regulations governing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
and with the Joint Policy Statement.”).
135. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(1)(i).
136. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. at 11470–71; 12 C.F.R. § 1002.6(a)(2) (Supp. I 2014).
137. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. at 11473.
138. Id. at 11473.
139. Id. at 11471.
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Since its enactment, there have been only a few cases interpreting
24 C.F.R. Section 100.500.  In Boykin v. Gray, the court granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a disparate impact
claim.140  In Boykin, the plaintiff claimed that the city violated the
FHA by closing down a ninety-bed homeless shelter because the clo-
sure disproportionately affected African-Americans and Hispanics.141
The court determined that the statistical evidence proffered by the
plaintiff was inadequate to show a disparate impact.142  The statistics
focused on the fact that minorities were overrepresented in the city’s
homeless population.143  However, the court emphasized that because
the homeless shelter only had ninety beds, only a small proportion of
the homeless population felt the negative impact of its closure.144
Moreover, the shelter’s closure was not the result of an adverse policy,
but a new policy that the city believed would better serve the home-
less population.145
In Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount
Holly, the third circuit vacated and remanded a grant of summary
judgment to the defendants on a disparate impact FHA claim.146
Plaintiffs claimed that the town destroyed existing homes in a neigh-
borhood occupied predominately by minorities and replaced them
with more expensive homes.147  The court held that the statistical evi-
dence provided was sufficient to satisfy the prima facie case.  The
plaintiffs used census data to show that 23% of African-American
households and 32% of Hispanic households in Mount Holly would
be destroyed, as compared to 3% of white households.148  Moreover,
after the new homes were built, only 21% of the minority households
would be able to afford them, as opposed to 79% of white
households.149
After establishing a prima facie case, the township stated that its
justification was “alleviating blight”—which is clearly a legitimate in-
terest.  However, the issue then becomes whether the city could have
140. Boykin v. Gray, 986 F.Supp.2d 14, 23 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2013).
141. Id. at 16.
142. Id. at 19–20 (“The fundamental defect in the plaintiffs’ argument is that the
adverse impact of which they complain was suffered not by the entire homeless popu-
lation in the District of Columbia, nor even by a significant portion of its more than
6,000 members. . . . Rather, the loss of La Casa Shelter—which had just ninety beds—
was felt by a much smaller subset of that population.”).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 21.
145. Boykin, 986 F.Supp.2d at 21.
146. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375,
377 (3d Cir. 2011).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 382.
149. Id.
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used a less discriminatory alternative.150  The court stated that the dis-
agreement among residents, policy makers, and experts raised a ques-
tion of material fact, and therefore, summary judgment was
improper.151
IV. LENDERS’ THREATS AGAINST CITIES SEEKING TO USE
EMINENT DOMAIN
To determine if disparate impact is likely to work to prevent lenders
from following through on their threats to withhold or drastically limit
credit to regions seeking to use eminent domain to seize mortgage
notes, we must go through the steps discussed above.152  First, we must
identify the facially neutral policy and demonstrate that “[the] chal-
lenged . . . [policy] caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory
effect” based on race.153  Second, we must anticipate and counter pos-
sible “nondiscriminatory interests” that the lenders will proffer.154
Lastly, we must identify “another practice that has a less discrimina-
tory effect” that could also serve the lenders’ nondiscriminatory
interest.155
Here, the facially neutral policy at issue is the lenders’ threat against
Richmond, and similar cities, that they will either refuse to extend
credit entirely, or raise interest rates so drastically that accessing
credit would be, effectively, impossible.156  This policy is facially neu-
tral because there is nothing to indicate that lenders would consider
race when determining to extend or deny credit to the citizens in
Richmond.  Rather, the policy seems like a blanket denial of credit to
all citizens of Richmond in response to the city’s actions.
Having identified a facially neutral policy, next we must show that
these threats will have a discriminatory effect on minorities.  “Gluck-
stern said on the Center for American Progress panel last week that
. . . ‘[t]he communities we are furthest along with in these talks are
mostly communities of color’ . . . .”157  Moreover, a report by the
Woodstock Institute found that in Chicago, “[b]orrowers in communi-
ties of color are more than twice as likely as are borrowers in white
communities to have little to no equity in their homes,” and that
“[a]lmost three times as many properties in communities of color are
severely underwater compared to properties in white communi-
150. Id. at 385 (although this case was decided before 24 C.F.R. § 100.500, the court
followed the appropriate burden-shifting framework, except for the least discrimina-
tory alternative).
151. Mt. Holly Garden, 658 F.3d at 386–87.
152. See supra Part II Section C.
153. Fair Housing Act, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2013).
154. § 100.500(c)(2).
155. § 100.500(c)(3).
156. See supra Part I Section C.
157. Prior, supra note 35.
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ties.”158  In addition to the Woodstock Report, a study conducted by
the Pew Research Center found that “[f]rom 2005 to 2009, the median
level of home equity held by Hispanic homeowners declined by half—
from $99,983 to $49,145”; while “black homeowners . . . [fell] from
$76,910 in 2005 to $59,000 in 2009”; and “white homeowners, . . . [fell]
from $115,364 in 2005 to $95,000 in 2009.”159  Therefore, this data sug-
gests that home equity was affected more severely in minority com-
munities than it was in white communities.
Furthermore, according to census data, the targeted cities have
large minority populations.  For example, in Richmond, according to
the 2010 census data, only 17.1% of its population responded that they
were both white and neither Hispanic nor Latino; this is in contrast to
the overall 40.1% in California.160  This discrepancy indicates that an
enormous percentage of Richmond’s population is either a racial or
an ethnic minority.  Similar to Richmond, several other California cit-
ies also have a white, non-Hispanic population that is far below the
expected percentage when considering the overall census data for Cal-
ifornia.161  This racial discrepancy is also present when comparing the
racial composition of the City of North Las Vegas (31.2% white, non-
Hispanic) to the overall population of Nevada (54.1%).162
Considering the discrepancy between the overall white, non-His-
panic population of these states and the white, non-Hispanic popula-
tions of the cities threatened by banks and lenders, it seems clear that
a policy refusing to extend credit to an entire city like Richmond
would have a disparate impact on minorities.  Here as in Mt. Holly
Gardens, if the City of Richmond filed suit to prevent lenders from
instituting a credit freeze, the census data would likely be strong
enough to establish a cognizable claim of disparate treatment, and
would therefore allow Richmond to, at a minimum, survive a motion
to dismiss.
Moreover, these threats affect all citizens within the city.  Unlike in
Boykin, where the closure of one moderate-sized homeless shelter
158. Spencer Cowan & Katie Buitrago, Struggling to Stay Afloat: Negative Equity in
Communities of Color in the Chicago Six Count Region, WOODSTOCK INSTITUTE
(Mar. 2012), available at http://www.woodstockinst.org/sites/default/files/documents/
stayingafloat_policybrief_mar2012_0.pdf.
159. Rakesh Kochhar et al., Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between Whites,
Blacks, and Hispanics, PEW RESEARCH SOCIAL & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS at *2, 4
(July 26, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-
highs-between-whites-blacks-hispanics/.
160. State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/states/06/0660620.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
161. State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/states/06/0664000.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2014) (These cities and their corre-
sponding white, non-Hispanic population percentages are:  Sacramento (34.5%); Po-
mona (12.5%); El Monte (4.9%); Oakland (25.9%); and Salinas (15.5%)).
162. State & County QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/states/32/3251800.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
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only affected a small portion of the homeless population, here the
lenders’ threats are against the entire city.  Indeed, if the lenders re-
fuse to extend credit or raise the interest rates, every citizen will be
affected by this moratorium, either directly or indirectly.
The second step in the burden-shifting framework requires that
lenders provide legitimate interests that support the threatened policy.
There are plausible explanations for the lenders’ desire to limit credit
availability to the City of Richmond: the first, and perhaps the more
likely reason of the two, is to retaliate against Richmond for under-
mining the authority of the financial system; and the second explana-
tion is that the lenders believe that they are losing money, and will
continue to lose money if the city government is free to seize any fu-
ture notes the lenders issue.  While the first explanation—retalia-
tion—may be an understandable motive, it is not a legally justifiable
defense to discrimination.  And, although the second interest may ini-
tially appear legitimate, closer examination reveals that it is merely
speculative and impulsive.
Interestingly, lender retaliation has already occurred.  After initial
approval of the eminent domain plan, Richmond needed to refinance
its municipal bonds.  These bonds are important for a city because
cities “depend on them to finance public projects like roads, schools
and utilities [and] [b]eing unable to sell or refinance bonds to lower
interest rates could hurt a city’s ability to meet its long-term obliga-
tions.”163  The bonds Richmond sought to refinance had an A- rating;
a rating that would normally interest lenders very much—but not this
time.  Councilman Nat Bates insisted that Richmond’s eminent do-
main plan was “exactly the reason the bonds were rejected,” claiming
that it was necessary for Richmond to “get back in good graces with
financial institutions.”164  Ultimately, the municipal bond debacle cost
the city “nearly $4 million in lost savings,”165 and could cost them
much more if Wall Street continues to refuse their bonds.  This behav-
ior by the lenders provides insight into what they think about this situ-
ation.  If lenders are willing to refuse to refinance highly-rated bonds,
how far will they go to get back at Richmond?
Although more legally sound than retaliation, a defense premised
on the lenders’ claims of lost money would fail because it is hypotheti-
cal and speculative.  Fear of losing money is certainly a substantial,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest.  However, here, it is uncertain
whether there would be an actual loss, and if so, how much that loss
would be.  The city and MRP plan to give the lenders fair market
value for the mortgage notes that they seize.  The loss of money that
the lenders are discussing is based on the presumption that the home-
163. Said, supra note 72.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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owners who are still current on their payments will not default.166
However, empirical evidence suggests that “80 percent of underwater
mortgages owned by private-label securities will end up defaulting.”167
If homeowners default on their outstanding loans, the lenders will
only get fair market value, or perhaps less, from the foreclosure sale.
This outcome would place the lenders in a position similar to, or
worse than, the situation resulting from eminent domain.  Ultimately,
the high probability of homeowner default on current mortgages
would likely make this interest fail to persuade a court that discrimi-
natory practices were necessary or legal.
Assuming arguendo, that courts accept the lenders interests as valid,
we will proceed to the last step: showing that the legitimate interests
“could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory
effect.”168  As discussed above, the evidence supporting this alterna-
tive practice cannot be “hypothetical or speculative.”169  It is possible
that there are many alternative practices that could protect the lend-
ers’ financial interest, but the most promising alternative is a compro-
mise between the city and the lenders.  Lenders could voluntarily
reduce the principal on all of the loans that the city would have other-
wise seized, resulting in an affordable monthly payment that reduces
the likelihood of default.
In essence, Richmond’s plan is to invoke the power of eminent do-
main to reduce the principal amounts owed on every loan.  Therefore,
rather than denying credit to an entire city, a less-discriminatory alter-
native practice would be for the lenders to reach a compromise with
the city wherein the city does not seize the mortgage notes, and the
lenders reduce the principals on the loans by a significant amount, but
not all the way down to fair market value of the property.
A compromise like this would keep homeowners in their homes; a
scenario where everyone wins.  First, the lenders continue to receive
the monthly payments from the homeowners and, because the
monthly payments are lower, the likelihood of default is reduced;
thus, the lender may actually make more money over time than they
would have if the overvalued principle had not been reduced.  Second,
the city lessens the chance that the homeowner will default, and by
keeping homes occupied, the city gets property taxes, prevents blight
caused by vacant and unmaintained homes, and ensures the stability
of the local economy.
Understandably, lenders are hesitant to reduce the principals on
loans because they write off a large chunk of money when they do
this, so they do not want to set a precedent of writing down principals
whenever home values go down.  However, the proposed compromise
166. See Harkinson, supra note 10.
167. Id.
168. Fair Housing Act, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3) (2013).
169. § 100.500(b)(2).
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is a solution to a widespread acute problem that we, as a society, hope
will not happen again.  It is not a go-to solution whenever housing
values drop in one neighborhood.  The housing market crash was a
national crisis that affected hundreds of thousands of homeowners
and this extreme situation requires a solution that reaches outside of
the box.
V. CONCLUSION
The prevalence of redlining in the early and middle 20th century
created a housing vacuum in many minority communities, which cre-
ated the “underworld of real estate finance,”170 where the only option
available to potential borrowers were subprime mortgages offered by
unscrupulous lenders.171  African-American borrowers were “6.1% to
34.3% more likely than white borrowers to receive a higher rate [of
interest on a] subprime mortgage.”172  Thus, when the housing bubble
burst, homeowners not only lost the equity in their homes, but were
also stuck with exorbitant interest rates and monthly payments that
they simply could not afford.173  It is estimated that towards the end of
2008 nearly 7.6 million homes were underwater, with another 2.1 mil-
lion on the cusp.174  Because their homes were now underwater, it was
too difficult to sell or refinance, so homeowners either had to struggle
to try to remain in their homes or simply walk away.175
MRP came up with a solution for cities that still have many home-
owners who are stuck with underwater homes.176  Their plan—to use
eminent domain to force lenders to sell the mortgage notes of 624
underwater homes in Richmond, California—has caused a lot of con-
troversy and has greatly upset lenders.177  Historically, the govern-
ment could only use eminent domain to seize tangible property to
build structures for public use, but under the Court’s most recent in-
terpretation of “public use,” the government can seize property to
promote economic development.178  MRP and the mayor of Rich-
mond argue that seizing underwater mortgage notes qualifies as a law-
ful exercise of the state’s eminent domain power because vacant
170. Swire, supra note 15, at 801.
171. Marcia Johnson, Will the Current Economic Crisis Fuel a Return to Racial Poli-
cies That Deny Homeownership Opportunity and Wealth?, 6 THE MODERN AMERI-
CAN 25, 29 (2010).
172. Nier & St. Cyr, supra note 16, at 947.
173. Id. at 946.
174. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial
Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 31 (2009).
175. Id.
176. Home, supra note 31.
177. Gibson, supra note 32; DePillis, supra note 30.
178. Fawcett, supra note 21, at 494; Kelo v. City of London, 545 U.S. 469, 472, 489
(2005).
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homes cause blight, and alleviating that blight is essential to promot-
ing Richmond’s economic development.179
The lenders, however, are upset at the prospect of only getting paid
fair market value on a loan that was originally worth much more, so
they have been threatening to stop extending credit or drastically raise
interest rates in cities investigating MRP’s proposed plan.180  Wall
Street has already begun to carry out these threats by refusing to refi-
nance Richmond’s highly rated municipal bonds, which Richmond
had not had trouble refinancing in the past.181
If the lenders do carry out their threats and make credit unavailable
or impracticable for citizens to access, the FHA and the ECOA will
protect the cities targeted by the credit freeze because the lenders’
actions would have a discriminatory effect on minorities.  To show dis-
criminatory effect, first the city will need to demonstrate that the lend-
ers threats of denying credit or raising interest rates “[have] caused or
predictably will cause a discriminatory effect” based on race or ethnic-
ity.182  In Richmond’s case, the city will be able to demonstrate this
because census data shows that Richmond has a large minority
population.183  Moreover, the Woodstock Institute Report found
that “[a]lmost three times as many properties in communities of color
are severely underwater compared to properties in white com-
munities.”184
Second, after Richmond proves its prima facie case, the burden will
then shift to the lenders to demonstrate that “the challenged practice
is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondis-
criminatory interests of the defendant.”185  Moreover, the interests
cannot be “hypothetical or speculative.”186  The financial interest that
the lenders will proffer will fail because it is too speculative.  The lend-
ers presume that they will lose money because the homeowners are
still preforming on their mortgages; however, data suggests that “80
percent of underwater mortgages owned by private-label securities
will end up defaulting.”187  Thus, when the homeowner defaults, the
lender will get fair market value or less from the foreclosure sale,
which would be equal to or less than what the city would give them
through eminent domain.
Third, assuming arguendo that the court allows this financial inter-
est to carry the lenders’ burden, the city would then have to demon-
179. DePillis, supra note 30; Dewan, supra note 29.
180. SIFMA, supra note 69; Media Statements, supra note 68; Shenn, et al., supra
note 40.
181. Said, supra note 72.
182. Fair Housing Act, 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2013).
183. State & County QuickFacts, supra note 160.
184. Cowan & Buitrago, supra note 158.
185. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2).
186. Id. § 100.500(b)(2).
187. Harkinson, supra note 10.
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strate that the “interest(s) supporting the challenged practice could be
served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”188
Richmond will likely prevail because there is an alternative practice
that would serve the lenders’ financial interest.  The lenders could vol-
untarily reduce the principal on all of the loans that Richmond would
have been able to seize to an amount that would result in an afforda-
ble monthly payment, thereby reducing the likelihood of default.  The
financial interest of the lenders would be sufficiently served because
they would continue to receive the monthly payments from the home-
owner; and because the monthly payments are lower, the likelihood of
default is reduced, so over time the lender may actually make more
than the fair market value of the home.  Because this alternative inter-
est would be sufficient, the city’s claim of disparate impact under the
FHA and the ECOA would succeed and the lenders’ threats would be
unlawful.
Therefore, if lenders were to implement a credit freeze, Richmond,
and other similarly situated cities, could sue the lenders for violation
of the FHA and the ECOA.  Ultimately, because the lenders’ threats
are unlawful, cities like Richmond should continue to investigate and
analyze MRP’s plan to determine if it is a reasonable solution to the
underwater mortgage problem.  These cities should do what is in the
best interests of their citizens and should not be afraid to stand up to
Wall Street.
188. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3).
